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February 27, 2026
In Case C-34/24, Stichting Right to Consumer Justice and Stichting App Stores Claims v Apple Distribution International Ltd and Apple Inc., the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union (the “CJEU” or the “Court”) clarified the territorial scope of special jurisdiction under Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 (“Brussels I Recast”). The case concerned representative collective actions brought in the Netherlands against Apple entities for alleged anticompetitive conduct in breach of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.
The Court addressed an important and novel question: where damage allegedly arises from excessive commissions charged by a digital platform operator targeting an entire Member State market, which national court within that Member State has territorial jurisdiction under Article 7(2)? More specifically, does jurisdiction fragment across multiple local courts based on individual consumers’ residence, or can any substantively competent court within the affected Member State hear the entire representative action?
Facts of the Case
Apple Inc., incorporated in the United States, and Apple Distribution International Ltd, incorporated in Ireland (together “Apple”), operate the App Store platform. Applications (apps) for Apple devices are distributed exclusively through this platform. Developers must contract with Apple and accept a commission structure, under which Apple deducts 15% or 30% of the sale price. In order to access the App Store, users of Apple devices must create a user profile by indicating a country or region. When the Netherlands is entered as the country, the user is directed by default to the online shop specifically designed for that country (the “App Store NL”).
Two Dutch foundations, Stichting Right to Consumer Justice and Stichting App Stores Claims (the “Applicants”), brought representative actions before the rechtbank Amsterdam (District Court, Amsterdam) (the “Referring Court”). Acting under Dutch collective redress legislation, the Applicants sought a declaration that Apple had engaged in anticompetitive conduct and compensation for damage allegedly suffered by users of the App Store NL.
The Applicants argued that Apple abused a dominant position, in breach of Article 102 TFEU, by charging excessive commissions, and infringed Article 101 TFEU through vertical pricefixing. According to them, the excessive commission was passed on to consumers via inflated app prices. As a result of that anticompetitive conduct, the users of those apps suffered damage.
Apple challenged the jurisdiction of the Dutch courts, contending that the harmful event did not occur in the Netherlands and that, in any event, territorial jurisdiction could not extend to users residing outside the Amsterdam judicial district. While the Referring Court found it had international jurisdiction under Article 7(2) Brussels I Recast, both as to the place of the causal event and the place where damage occurred, it was uncertain about territorial jurisdiction within the Netherlands. Since users resided across different Dutch judicial districts, the question arose whether jurisdiction must be divided among multiple courts.
The Referring Court referred several questions to the CJEU, primarily concerning how to determine the “place where the damage occurred” in a representative action relating to online purchases across an entire national market.
Legal Framework
The Brussels I Recast Regulation establishes uniform, mandatory jurisdiction rules for civil and commercial disputes in EU Member States. The rules of jurisdiction are founded on the principle that jurisdiction is generally based on the defendant’s domicile, save for a few well-defined situations in which the subject-matter of the dispute or the autonomy of the parties warrants a different connecting factor.
Article 7(2) of Brussels I Recast provides that a defendant domiciled in a Member State may be sued “in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur.” This rule of special jurisdiction is based on the existence of a particularly close connecting factor between the dispute and the courts of the place where the harmful event occurred, which justifies the attribution of jurisdiction to those courts for reasons relating to the sound administration of justice and the efficacious conduct of proceedings.
CJEU case-law has long interpreted this provision as covering both:
- The place of the event giving rise to the damage; and
- The place where the damage occurred.
The rule constitutes a derogation from the general jurisdiction of the defendant’s domicile and must therefore be interpreted strictly. However, it is grounded in considerations of proximity, predictability, and the sound administration of justice. In competition cases, the CJEU has previously held, in flyLAL-Lithuanian Airlines (C-27/17), that the place where the damage occurs is generally the market affected by the anticompetitive conduct.
Considerations of the Court
a. Nature of the Damage
The Court began by examining the nature of the alleged harm. The damage claimed consisted of additional costs paid by users as a result of Apple’s allegedly excessive commission, which was passed on through increased app prices. The Court characterised this as initial and direct damage rather than indirect or consequential loss. As such, it was capable of grounding jurisdiction under Article 7(2).
This clarification was important because the Court’s case-law distinguishes between direct damage, which may establish jurisdiction, and subsequent adverse consequences felt elsewhere, which cannot. In the present case, the overpayment by users was the immediate economic effect of the alleged abuse.
b. The Place Where the Damage Occurred
The Court reaffirmed its earlier competition law case-law, particularly flyLAL-Lithuanian Airlines (C-27/17) and Volvo (C-30/20), according to which the place where damage occurs in antitrust cases is the market affected by the unlawful conduct. The Referring Court had already found that the App Store NL was specifically directed at the Netherlands market. It used the Dutch language, was linked to Apple IDs associated with the Netherlands, and functioned as a national digital marketplace.
On that basis, the Court accepted that the Netherlands constituted the place where the damage occurred for the purposes of Article 7(2). The crucial question, however, was how to determine territorial jurisdiction within that Member State.
c. Territorial Jurisdiction in Representative Actions
The central difficulty arose from the collective nature of the action. The users allegedly harmed were numerous and not individually identified at the time the action was brought. They were, however, identifiable as members of a strictly defined group consisting of users who purchased apps through the App Store NL.
The Court rejected the notion that territorial jurisdiction must be assessed separately for each individual user. Requiring a court to identify, for every affected person, the precise place where damage occurred would be impracticable and incompatible with the structure of representative proceedings. Unlike in cases involving assigned claims by identified victims, the Applicants in the present case exercised their own right of action in defence of collective interests.
In adapting its earlier approach from Volvo (C-30/20), which had linked jurisdiction to the place of purchase or the claimant’s registered office, the Court recognised that digital purchases on a national online platform do not lend themselves to identification of a single physical place of transaction. Instead, it introduced a functional understanding of the “virtual space” of the platform. Because the App Store NL was specifically designed for the Netherlands market, that virtual space corresponded to the entire national territory.
The damage therefore occurred throughout the Netherlands. Consequently, any Dutch court having substantive jurisdiction under national law to hear such a representative action could exercise both international and territorial jurisdiction over the entire claim.
d. Consistency with the Objectives of Brussels I Recast
The Court examined whether this interpretation respected the objectives of proximity, predictability, and sound administration of justice. It concluded that it did.
In terms of proximity, each substantively competent Dutch court had an equivalent connection to the dispute, since the alleged conduct affected the national market as a whole. Regarding predictability, Apple could reasonably foresee being sued in the Netherlands, given that the App Store NL was specifically targeted at that market.
The Court also emphasised procedural efficiency. Fragmentation of jurisdiction among multiple district courts would risk divergent decisions and undermine the effectiveness of collective redress. In competition law cases, often requiring complex economic assessment, centralised adjudication may be particularly appropriate. The Court thus signalled a pragmatic approach to jurisdiction in digital and mass harm contexts.
Conclusion
The Court ruled that, within the market of a Member State allegedly affected by anticompetitive conduct consisting of excessive commissions charged by an online platform operator targeting users in that State, any court having substantive jurisdiction in that Member State may exercise international and territorial jurisdiction under Article 7(2), on the basis of the place where the damage occurred, to hear a representative action concerning all affected users.
As a result, the rechtbank Amsterdam was entitled to hear the collective claims in their entirety.
This judgement adapts established jurisdictional principles to the realities of digital markets and collective redress mechanisms. By conceptualising a nationally targeted online platform as corresponding to the territory of the affected Member State, the Court ensured that Article 7(2) remains effective in the digital economy.
Disclaimer: Ganado Advocates is responsible for contributing to this law report but was not in any way involved as legal advisor for the parties in the judgement being covered in this law report. This article was first published in ‘the Independent’ on 25/02/2026.
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